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The accurate evaluation of agents’ work and the provision of appropriate compensation contracts is an
important issue (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The cost of directly supervising executives is quite high, thus
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return level, it is likely to be the most important economic characteristic. This information is considered to be
reliable under modern accounting and auditing systems, and thus is widely applied. However, information on
the company itself is not suﬃciently accurate for evaluating managers’ eﬀorts because a company is in an open
system, aﬀected by many external factors that are not directly related to the eﬀort of managers. Therefore,
using only the performance of the company to value managers’ eﬀorts will create a bias. However, the method
of evaluation would be improved if we could exclude systemic factors.
RPE theory is based on this logic. The theory assumes that companies inevitably face industry-level or
macro-level external risk (common risk), and an optimal compensation contract that eliminates these common
risks will be more eﬃcient (Holmstrom, 1982; Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). Neverthe-
less, RPE theory does not produce consistent empirical results. For example, Antle and Smith (1986) and
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) ﬁnd no support for the theory, and Gibbons and Murphy(1990), Janakiraman
et al. (1992) and Crawford (1999) ﬁnd only weak support.
Recent years have seen new developments in the research on RPE. One area of research involves identifying
more appropriate peer groups from theoretical inference (Albuquerque, 2009). Another area extracts informa-
tion on peer groups directly from companies’ annual reports (Carter et al., 2009; Faulkender and Yang,2010;
Gong et al., 2011). Although empirical research has provided strong support for these two methods, there is
little empirical evidence from China. Nevertheless, this issue is of concern in the context of China. For exam-
ple, the foreign literature cannot provide any conclusions on whether there are diﬀerences in the use of RPE
between SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) and non-SOEs (non-State Owned Enterprises). The executive com-
pensation models of SOEs and non-SOEs are quite diﬀerent. For example, SOEs have cash compensation reg-
ulations (Chen et al., 2005a). In addition, non-SOEs are more market-oriented and face more intense
competition. Thus, on the one hand, we need to consider the diﬀerence in the nature of SOEs and non-SOEs
when selecting peer groups, but on the other hand, non-SOEs may be more likely to use RPE.
Using data from 1999 to 2009, we conduct an empirical test of RPE theory in China. Overall, we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant RPE in China and also no asymmetry in the use of RPE. Considering the nature of companies, we
ﬁnd that non-SOEs are more likely to use RPE. We select peer groups using both the traditional method of
Janakiraman et al. (1992), and the method described by Albuquerque (2009). We also conduct a strong-form
RPE check, following Antle and Smith (1986). The results are consistent under all methods.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the literature review, theoretical analysis and
hypothesis development. In Section 3, we describe the sample selection, variable deﬁnitions and descriptive
statistics. We present the empirical tests in Section 4 and conclusions and limitations in Section 5.
2. Literature review, theoretical analysis and hypothesis development
RPE theory is logical and widely applicable. In the case of common risk, using the RPE method to choose a
peer group can eﬀectively extract the individual eﬀort of managers and mitigate agency problems. The theory
and models of RPE suggest that it is necessary to exclude the combined eﬀect of peer groups (Baiman and
Demski, 1980; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982; Holmstrom, 1979, 1982). Antle and Smith (1986) and Gibbons
and Murphy (1990) show that the beneﬁt of adding relative performance considerations to executive compen-
sation contracts is greater than the cost.
However, theoretical expectations have not received consistent support from empirical studies. Antle and
Smith (1986) examine the relationship between CEO compensation and industry returns from 1947 to 1977.
Using diﬀerent deﬁnitions of compensation, they only ﬁnd weak support for RPE. Gibbons and Murphy
(1990) examine the relationship between change in compensation and ﬁrm stock returns for 1668 CEOs from
1974 to 1986. Their results show that changes in compensation are negatively related to industry and market
performance. They also ﬁnd evidence that RPE is related to CEO turnover. Jensen and Murphy (1990) ﬁnd
that changes in CEO compensation are positively related to changes in shareholder wealth. However, they ﬁnd
no signiﬁcant relationships between change in compensation and change in net-of-industry wealth or net-of-
market wealth. Janakiraman et al. (1992) examine 609 companies from 1970 to 1988. They ﬁnd weak evidence
in support of weak-form RPE, but no evidence in support of strong-form RPE. Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999b) examine stock returns from 1993 to 1996 and use several methods, including median regressions
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port for RPE using short-term compensation, but long-term compensation increases with industry perfor-
mance. Garvey and Milbourn (2003) examine the relationship between CEO compensation and stock
returns and ﬁnd no support for RPE, except in companies where managers are younger and have less ﬁnancial
wealth.
To resolve such conﬂicts, researchers have oﬀered possible explanations for the lack of RPE. On the one
hand, constraint conditions will limit the use of RPE. For example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999a) point
out that the degree of competition might be an important factor in using RPE. On the other hand, the eﬃ-
ciency of compensation contracts is also in doubt. For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) ﬁnd that in the
case of poor corporate governance, CEOs can inﬂuence their own pay through their control over the design
of CEO compensation. This will reduce the sensitivity of compensation and also lead to a lack of RPE.
There have been few empirical studies of RPE in China. Xiao (2005) tests the strong- and weak-form RPE
in a sample of listed companies in 2002. Using the average ROE of peer groups in the same region and the
average ROE by 2-digit industry code, they ﬁnd evidence of weak-form, but not strong-form RPE. Gao
(2006) uses a sample of all A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2004 to test the theory. He ﬁnds that
RPE exists when the peer group is comprised of similar industry-size ﬁrms or the same industry-ownership
ﬁrms. However, the article neither explains the theoretical base for the composition of peer groups, nor com-
pares companies with diﬀerent ownership types. Zhou and Zhang (2010) examine the eﬀect of RPE in listed
companies in China from 1999 to 2006 using their comprehensive index of performance. They ﬁnd that RPE
exists when peer groups are based on area, but ﬁnd opposite eﬀects when peer groups are based on industry or
size. However, the comprehensive index of performance designed by the authors is a subjective measure.
In recent years, there has been substantial progress in the study of RPE. Albuquerque (2009) proposes a
new theory and method for selecting peer groups. He regards size as the most important factor aﬀecting out-
side risks at the company level. For example, large companies often face lower ﬁnancing constraints because
they are more likely to survive in the event of negative shocks. Additionally, size is often related to diversity
and the degree of diversity can aﬀect companies’ risk tolerance. His empirical results support RPE theory.
Carter et al. (2009) hand-collect information on peer groups in FTSE-listed companies in the UK. They ﬁnd
that the probability of using RPE does not increase when systemic risk increases, whereas external monitoring
is an important factor for using RPE. Faulkender and Yang (2010) hand-collect information on peer groups in
compensation plans in the US. Their results support RPE theory and their direct method has advantages over
traditional methods, such as the industry-size peer group method. In addition, they ﬁnd that companies prefer
to put companies with high pay into their peer groups. Gong et al. (2011) also use manually collected infor-
mation on peer groups in compensation plans in the US to test RPE theory. They ﬁnd that 25% of listed com-
panies explicitly use peer groups and the choice of peer groups supports a mixture of eﬀective contract theory
and rent-seeking theory.
In our opinion, it is essential to study RPE theory in China. First, studies on RPE in China are still rare and
those that exist are mainly normative studies. Second, the existing empirical studies have produced mixed
results (Xiao, 2005; Gao, 2006; Zhou and Zhang, 2010), thus improving RPE methodology is important.
Third, we believe that the nature of ownership is an important factor to be considered in studying RPE, which
is not generally considered either in China or elsewhere1.
There are various diﬀerences in the way executive compensation is designed and evaluated for SOEs and
non-SOEs. First, there are regulations on cash compensation in Chinese SOEs. In 2002 and 2009, for example,
the SAC set multiple limits for executive cash compensation in SOEs.2 However, there is no limit in non-SOEs,
so executive compensation in non-SOEs is more market-oriented. Chen et al. (2005a) provide evidence that
executives’ relative pay in SOEs is far less than in non-SOEs.3 Second, there are various forms of incentives1 The inﬂuence of the nature of ownership in studying RPE is important. We need to compare the diﬀerence between the incentives of
SOEs and non-SOEs to use RPE in a theoretical analysis, and we should also consider it in the methodology for constructing peer groups.
2 The Guidelines about Further Standardizing the Executive Compensation in SOEs, issued in 2009, rules that the basic salary of executives
in SOEs must not exceed ﬁve times the average salary of the workers and the upper limit for performance-related salary is three times their
basic salary.
3 Relative pay means the ratio of executives’ average salary to non-executives’ average salary.
130 D. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 127–144in SOEs. For example, Chen et al. (2005a) ﬁnd that perks were widely used as an incentive. Cao et al. (2010),
Chen et al. (2011a) and Wang and Xiao (2011) argue that the opportunity for promotion of executives in
SOEs is also an important incentive. However, such incentives are rare in non-SOEs and cash compensation
is dominant.4 Third, SOEs are aﬀected by multiple tasks. Bai and Xu (2005) and Bai et al. (2006) ﬁnd that
executives in SOEs undertake diverse tasks. Executives in SOEs not only need to improve performance, but
also need to consider other issues, such as the employment of workers. However, non-SOEs are often subject
to less government intervention (Chen et al., 2011b), so performance is likely to be more closely related to
executive evaluation.
The above diﬀerences may cause RPE to be applied diﬀerently in SOEs and non-SOEs. First, the regulation
of executive cash compensation is expected to reduce the eﬀect of RPE. For example, when cash compensation
is close to the limit, even if relative performance is high, executives may not work harder, thus RPE is not
eﬀective. Second, the various forms of incentives in SOEs will reduce the beneﬁt of RPE, because cash com-
pensation is just one type of incentive in SOEs. Third, multiple tasks will obscure the relationship between ﬁrm
performance and executive eﬀort, which will increase the implementation cost of RPE. For example, the per-
formance in company A’s ﬁnancial statements is lower than in company B’s, but company A undertakes a lot
of redundancies. Is the performance of company A better or worse than that of company B? However, in non-
SOEs, there is no regulation of executive cash compensation, there is only one form of incentive and there is
less intervention from multiple governmental goals, thus implementation of RPE will be easier and the net
eﬀects of RPE will be more obvious.
In summary, we believe that RPE is more likely to be applied in non-SOEs than in SOEs.3. Sample selection, deﬁnition of variables and descriptive statistics
3.1. Sample selection
The initial sample used in this study comprises 15,238 observations for A-share ﬁrms listed on the Shanghai
and Shenzhen stock markets. We screened the sample as follows: (1) we remove 2541 observations for ﬁrms
that had been listed for less than 2 years; (2) we remove 119 ﬁnancial companies; and (3) we remove 1881
observations with missing values. A total of 10,724 observations remain. To reduce the inﬂuence of extreme
values, we exclude the top and bottom 1% of Roe and Ret values, which leaves 10,321 observations. The data
used is from the CSMAR and CCER databases. We use SAS and STATA software to process the data. The
procedure for sample selection is listed in Table 1.3.2. Construction of peer groups
We use two methods to construct peer groups. The ﬁrst group, denoted as M1, includes companies in the
same year, with the same ownership type and the same industry (excluding the company itself). The second
group, denoted as M2, includes companies in the same year, with the same ownership type, the same industry
and of a similar size (excluding the company itself). The construction of M2 follows Albuquerque (2009). Sim-
ilar size was deﬁned as companies in the same quartile. Albuquerque (2009) believes that systematic discrep-
ancies exist between diﬀerent sized companies. For M2, each peer group was required to have at least three
observations. Therefore, 722 observations were removed. The remaining 9590 observations were included
in the ﬁnal analysis.3.3. Deﬁnition of variables
Table 2 shows the deﬁnitions of variables.
We select Ret and Roe as measurements of company performance. Ret is the cumulative stock returns from
May to April in the following year (using the BHR method). Peer group performance is recorded as Peer_ret4 Stock options have only recently become popular, and were not dominant in these sample years.
Table 1
Sample selection.
Year Initial
observations
Observations for companies
listed less than 2 years
Observations for listed
ﬁnancial companies
Observations with
missing data
Remaining
observations
1999 1105 384 5 431 285
2000 1147 320 5 564 258
2001 1224 299 6 137 782
2002 1284 223 7 100 954
2003 1393 253 7 108 1025
2004 1396 186 8 92 1110
2005 1361 116 10 81 1154
2006 1442 110 10 97 1225
2007 1552 215 14 85 1238
2008 1606 204 17 83 1302
2009 1728 204 30 103 1391
Total 15,238 2514 119 1881 10,724
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions.
Name Symbol Explanation
Stock return Ret Cumulative stock returns from May to April of the following year
Accounting performance Roe Net proﬁt/equity
Accounting performance of peer group Peer_roe Average Roe of peer group
Stock return of peer group Peer_ret Average Ret of peer group
Age of listed company Age Age of listed company
Leverage of company Lev Debt/assets
Scale of company Size Natural logarithm of assets
Growth of company Growth Growth in operating income
Proportion of largest stockholder Sh Proportion shares held by the largest stockholder
Proportion of management Mshare Proportion of shares held by management
Proportion of independent directors Rinde Proportion of independent directors
Dual CEO and Chairman of the Board Dual Dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO and Chairman are the same, otherwise 0
Nature of ownership Pri Dummy variable that equals 1 for non-SOEs, otherwise 0
Year Year Dummy variable, every year
Industry Industry Dummy variable, every industry
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refers to Reer_ret2 and Peer_roe2). Lncp is the natural logarithm of the total cash compensation of the top
three managers. Age is the number of years the company has been listed. Lev is the company’s leverage. Size
is the size of the company, the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year. Growth is the income
growth rate. Sh is the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder. Mshare is the shareholding ratio of man-
agers. Rinde is the ratio of independent directors to the total number of directors. Dual is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the same person holds the positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board, and 0 otherwise. Pri
is a dummy variable for the proprietary nature of the enterprise; it equals 1 if the company is a non-SOE, and
0 otherwise. Year are dummy variables for every year. Industry are industry dummy variables set by the
CSRC.
3.4. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables. The mean and median of Ret are 0.29 and
0.02 respectively, indicating a skewed distribution. The mean and median of accounting performance are 0.04
and 0.06 respectively. The average years listed (Age) is 7 years. Leverage (Lev) is around 50%. In about 10% of
companies, the CEO and Chairman of the Board is the same person (Dual).
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean Lower quartile Median Upper quartile Standard deviation
Lncp 13.0771 12.4549 13.1520 13.7369 0.9702
Ret 0.2889 0.2511 0.0232 0.4375 0.8906
Peer_ret1 0.2887 0.1742 0.0161 0.4402 0.7671
Peer_ret2 0.2889 0.1817 0.0002 0.4218 0.7850
Roe 0.0399 0.0204 0.0604 0.1069 0.1743
Peer_roe1 0.0397 0.0163 0.0456 0.0711 0.0463
Peer_roe2 0.0399 0.0122 0.0510 0.0871 0.0808
Age 7.6273 5 7 10 3.6808
Lev 0.4931 0.3675 0.5047 0.6270 0.1799
Size 21.4114 20.7101 21.3062 21.9950 1.0638
Growth 0.5181 0.0249 0.1310 0.3148 16.0782
Sh 0.3983 0.2649 0.3813 0.5255 0.1660
Mshare 0.0033 0 0.0000 0.0001 0.0267
Rinde 0.3106 0.3000 0.3333 0.3636 0.1196
Dual 0.0975 0 0 0 0.2966
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triangle and the Spearman correlation matrix is in the upper triangle. We ﬁnd that managers’ compensation
(Lncp) is signiﬁcantly and positively related to company performance (Ret, Roe), which shows the eﬀectiveness
of executive pay. Table 4 also shows that the main explanatory variables do not have any severe collinearity
problems.4. Empirical tests
4.1. Do Chinese companies use RPE?
Following Albuquerque (2009), we establish model (1) to test whether listed companies in China adopt the
RPE method to determine executive pay.Lncp ¼ a0 þ a1RetðRoeÞ þ a2Peer retðPeer roeÞ þ a3Ageþ a4Levþ a5Sizeþ a6Growthþ a7Sh
þ a8Mshareþ a9Rindeþ a10Dualþ RYear þ RIndustry þ e ð1ÞTable 5 displays the regression results using the method of clustering by companies and we report robust
t-values. The explanatory variables in columns (1) and (3) of Table 5 are Peer_ret and Peer_roe, composed
according to M1 (the same year, the same ownership and the same industry). The explanatory variables in
columns (2) and (4) of Table 5 are Peer_ret and Peer_roe, composed according to M2 (the same year, the same
ownership, the same industry and similar size). We ﬁnd that company performance (Ret, Roe) is positive and
signiﬁcant, but peer group performance is not signiﬁcant. This suggests that companies in China do not gen-
erally use RPE.
Albuquerque (2009) argues that there is asymmetry in the use of RPE: companies with poor performance
are more likely to use RPE to avoid litigation risks. We follow Albuquerque (2009) and use model (2) to test
this deduction.Lncp ¼ a0 þ a1RetðRoeÞ þ a2Peer retðPeer roeÞ þ a3Peer retðPeer roeÞ  Dþ a4Dþ a5Ageþ a6Lev
þ a7Sizeþ a8Growthþ a9Shþ a10Mshareþ a11Rindeþ a12Dualþ RYear þ RIndustry þ e ð2ÞIn this model, D is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if the company’s performance is below the lower quartile
and 0 otherwise. D1 and D2 refer to Ret and Roe respectively.
The regression results are shown in Table 6. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative interaction only in column (3).
The remaining interaction terms are insigniﬁcant. These results suggest that there is no asymmetry in the use of
Table 4
Correlations.
Lncp Ret Peer_ret1 Peer_ret2 Roe Peer_roe1 Peer_roe2 Age Lev Size Growth Sh Mshare Rinde Dual
Lncp 1.0000 0.1323 0.1384 0.1409 0.3262 0.1590 0.2247 0.2850 0.0560 0.4167 0.0724 0.1127 0.0678 0.3573 0.0008
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9360
Ret 0.0689 1.0000 0.7725 0.7670 0.1829 0.0891 0.0840 0.0737 0.0084 0.0558 0.0355 0.0399 0.0116 0.1587 0.0121
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.4125 <.0001 0.0005 <.0001 0.2576 <.0001 0.2371
Peer_ret1 0.0744 0.8531 1.0000 0.9423 0.0536 0.1640 0.1105 0.1355 0.0310 0.0490 0.0733 0.0811 0.0307 0.2298 0.0026
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0024 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0026 <.0001 0.8020
Peer_ret2 0.0720 0.8435 0.9776 1.0000 0.0611 0.1383 0.1521 0.1278 0.0288 0.0735 0.0616 0.0777 0.0250 0.2189 0.0061
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0048 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0142 <.0001 0.5497
Roe 0.2167 0.0543 0.0125 0.0136 1.0000 0.1833 0.2484 0.0410 0.0613 0.2524 0.3639 0.1085 0.0491 0.0436 0.0016
<.0001 <.0001 0.2203 0.1830 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8774
Peer_roe1 0.1179 0.0411 0.0536 0.0514 0.1428 1.0000 0.5502 0.1095 0.0115 0.1337 0.0634 0.0148 0.0381 0.1176 0.0076
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2619 <.0001 <.0001 0.1477 0.0002 <.0001 0.4575
Peer_roe2 0.1568 0.0259 0.0298 0.0416 0.1451 0.5620 1.0000 0.0784 0.0763 0.4308 0.1009 0.0390 0.0126 0.0806 0.0065
<.0001 0.0114 0.0035 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001 0.2185 <.0001 0.5234
Age 0.2995 0.0672 0.0760 0.0779 0.0339 0.0798 0.0488 1.0000 0.1675 0.1485 0.1032 0.2395 0.0101 0.2754 0.0444
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0009 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.3214 <.0001 <.0001
Lev 0.0586 0.0435 0.0349 0.0300 0.2001 0.0212 0.0552 0.1540 1.0000 0.2293 0.0809 0.0828 0.0567 0.0922 0.0225
<.0001 <.0001 0.0006 0.0034 <.0001 0.0379 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0277
Size 0.4212 0.0075 0.0158 0.0084 0.1904 0.1451 0.3467 0.1228 0.2195 1.0000 0.1276 0.1787 0.0455 0.1381 0.0550
<.0001 0.4652 0.1229 0.4093 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Growth 0.0054 0.0065 0.0119 0.0132 0.0197 0.0037 0.0071 0.0143 0.0073 0.0066 1.0000 0.0831 0.0189 0.0036 0.0046
0.5983 0.5276 0.2446 0.1966 0.0533 0.7203 0.4899 0.1630 0.4755 0.5154 <.0001 0.0644 0.7248 0.6521
Sh 0.1334 0.0728 0.0871 0.0876 0.0960 0.0253 0.0684 0.2466 0.0819 0.2000 0.0042 1.0000 0.1086 0.1261 0.0515
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0133 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.6848 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Mshare 0.0899 0.0266 0.0425 0.0358 0.0389 0.0033 0.0039 0.1331 0.0508 0.0537 0.0024 0.1033 1.0000 0.0875 0.0891
<.0001 0.0092 <.0001 0.0005 0.0001 0.7449 0.7043 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8168 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Rinde 0.4377 0.1305 0.1525 0.1500 0.0271 0.0653 0.0401 0.3177 0.0966 0.1542 0.0062 0.1311 0.0656 1.0000 0.0013
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0081 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.5442 <.0001 <.0001 0.8967
Dual 0.0011 0.0008 0.0048 0.0048 0.0042 0.0107 0.0025 0.0412 0.0177 0.0644 0.0013 0.0518 0.1092 0.0280 1.0000
0.9117 0.9396 0.6392 0.6374 0.6818 0.2957 0.8036 <.0001 0.0823 <.0001 0.8986 <.0001 <.0001 0.0062
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Table 5
Relative performance evaluation and executive compensation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Ret 0.0349 0.0320
(2.56) (2.37)
Peer_ret 0.0503 0.0028
(1.08) (0.09)
Roe 0.7531 0.7534
(10.95) (10.98)
Peer_roe 0.1650 0.0935
(0.74) (0.81)
Age 0.0055 0.0056 0.0074 0.0074
(1.16) (1.17) (1.59) (1.59)
Lev 0.4441 0.4427 0.2496 0.2487
(5.11) (5.09) (2.86) (2.85)
Size 0.3458 0.3461 0.3167 0.3189
(20.42) (20.41) (19.09) (18.99)
Growth 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
(2.53) (2.57) (1.15) (1.16)
Sh 0.5046 0.5044 0.5358 0.5360
(4.82) (4.82) (5.24) (5.24)
Mshare 1.6866 1.6794 1.4961 1.5015
(5.30) (5.27) (4.89) (4.90)
Rinde 0.4604 0.4602 0.4314 0.4315
(2.93) (2.93) (2.83) (2.83)
Dual 0.0741 0.0741 0.0724 0.0726
(1.68) (1.68) (1.68) (1.69)
Constant 6.4755 6.4448 6.9516 6.9008
(17.77) (17.62) (19.67) (19.31)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9590 9590 9590 9590
R-squared 0.4697 0.4696 0.4854 0.4854
F 134.0 134.1 137.1 137.0
Note: The regression results follow the cluster method (by company) and we report robust t values. , ,  represent signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed) in all tables. M1 refers to peer groups constructed according to the same year, the same type of
ownership and the same industry. M2 refers to peer groups constructed according to the same year, the same type of ownership, the same
industry and the same scale.
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tional method of constructing peer groups.4.2. The diﬀerence between SOEs and non-SOEs
Earlier, we discussed a series of diﬀerences in executive compensation between SOEs and non-SOEs. These
diﬀerences will also aﬀect the use of RPE, especially in non-SOEs. To test this inference, we regress model (1)
on diﬀerent subsamples according to the type of ownership.
Table 7 Panel A presents the regression results. Peer group performance for SOEs is positive or insigniﬁ-
cant. Peer group performance for non-SOEs is negative, but only signiﬁcant in column (8). To compare the
two groups, we construct model (3). Pri is a dummy variable that equals 1 for non-SOEs, and 0 otherwise.
If non-SOEs use RPE more than SEOs, then the interaction should be signiﬁcantly negative.Lncp ¼ a0 þ a1RetðRoeÞ þ a2Peer retðPeer roeÞ þ a3Peer retðPeer roeÞ  Priþ a4Priþ a5Ageþ a6Lev
þ a7Sizeþ a8Growthþ a9Shþ a10Mshareþ a11Rindeþ a12Dualþ RYear þ RIndustry þ e ð3Þ
Table 6
Asymmetry of relative performance evaluation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Ret 0.0147 0.0112
(1.04) (0.80)
Peer_ret 0.0610 0.0013
(1.27) (0.04)
Peer_ret  D1 0.0480 0.0235
(0.38) (0.25)
D1 0.0836 0.0931
(3.16) (3.69)
Roe 0.4364 0.4332
(6.31) (6.29)
Peer_roe 0.0738 0.0124
(0.29) (0.09)
Peer_roe  D2 0.9007 0.3332
(2.07) (1.38)
D2 0.2111 0.2325
(7.04) (8.74)
Age 0.0055 0.0055 0.0089 0.0089
(1.15) (1.16) (1.93) (1.93)
Lev 0.4332 0.4316 0.2594 0.2584
(4.99) (4.97) (3.02) (3.01)
Size 0.3442 0.3445 0.3090 0.3117
(20.40) (20.38) (18.69) (18.65)
Growth 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
(2.51) (2.53) (0.90) (0.90)
Sh 0.5108 0.5108 0.5424 0.5414
(4.89) (4.89) (5.37) (5.36)
Mshare 1.6683 1.6626 1.4791 1.5018
(5.25) (5.22) (4.92) (4.97)
Rinde 0.4577 0.4582 0.4235 0.4241
(2.92) (2.92) (2.79) (2.79)
Dual 0.0720 0.0720 0.0718 0.0726
(1.64) (1.64) (1.67) (1.69)
Constant 6.5254 6.4908 7.1743 7.1175
(17.98) (17.81) (20.45) (20.09)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9590 9590 9590 9590
R-squared 0.4707 0.4707 0.4935 0.4933
F 127.7 127.7 132.0 132.0
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in columns (1) and (2), and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in column (3). These results support our inference that
non-SOEs use RPE more than SOEs.4.3. Tests of strong-form RPE
According to Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), executive compensation should be adjusted for systematic
risks associated with performance, and should only relate to the company’s own performance. Antle and
Smith(1986), Janakiraman et al. (1992) and Albuquerque (2009) perform an empirical test of this strong-form
RPE. Following the above literature, we divide company performance (Perf) into performance with systemic
risk (Sys_perf) and with its own risk (Unsys_perf).Perf ¼ a0 þ a1Peer perf þ e ð4Þ
Table 7
Relative performance evaluation, ownership and executive compensation.
SOEs Non-SOEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
Panel A: Subsample tests
Ret 0.0377 0.0363 0.0258 0.0253
(2.31) (2.26) (1.02) (0.98)
Peer_ret 0.0261 0.0395 0.1175 0.0358
(0.50) (1.03) (1.53) (0.67)
Roe 0.9057 0.9030 0.4622 0.4586
(10.43) (10.40) (4.80) (4.75)
Peer_roe 0.2651 0.0150 0.1656 0.2717
(1.04) (0.10) (0.49) (1.66)
Age 0.0101 0.0101 0.0124 0.0123 0.0013 0.0012 0.0009 0.0012
(1.78) (1.78) (2.25) (2.24) (0.16) (0.15) (0.11) (0.15)
Lev 0.4761 0.4755 0.2508 0.2504 0.3332 0.3330 0.1974 0.1979
(4.82) (4.81) (2.52) (2.52) (2.15) (2.15) (1.27) (1.27)
Size 0.3247 0.3251 0.2910 0.2914 0.4005 0.4010 0.3789 0.3870
(16.88) (16.86) (15.55) (15.39) (12.87) (12.89) (12.04) (12.10)
Growth 0.0029 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
(0.60) (0.60) (0.00) (0.01) (2.66) (2.76) (2.03) (2.02)
Sh 0.4906 0.4908 0.5264 0.5260 0.4269 0.4276 0.4751 0.4759
(4.21) (4.22) (4.66) (4.65) (2.27) (2.27) (2.55) (2.56)
Mshare 7.4135 7.3924 7.1416 7.1564 1.2406 1.2348 1.1195 1.1237
(4.64) (4.62) (4.41) (4.41) (3.40) (3.38) (3.13) (3.15)
Rinde 0.5832 0.5830 0.5373 0.5372 0.3472 0.3483 0.3503 0.3511
(3.13) (3.13) (3.01) (3.01) (1.25) (1.25) (1.27) (1.27)
Dual 0.0183 0.0185 0.0262 0.0262 0.1810 0.1814 0.1727 0.1732
(0.34) (0.34) (0.49) (0.49) (2.53) (2.54) (2.47) (2.49)
Constant 6.9696 6.9561 7.5658 7.5456 5.1900 5.1284 5.5175 5.3557
(16.66) (16.52) (18.72) (18.41) (7.53) (7.45) (8.01) (7.69)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7157 7157 7157 7157 2433 2433 2433 2433
R-squared 0.5054 0.5054 0.5238 0.5237 0.3717 0.3715 0.3816 0.3824
F 119.9 119.8 122.6 122.4 26.90 26.87 27.31 27.41
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Panel B: Full sample tests using interaction terms
Ret 0.0356 0.0332
(2.63) (2.47)
Peer_ret 0.0137 0.0307
(0.29) (0.96)
Peer_retPri 0.0460 0.0482
(2.71) (2.83)
Roe 0.7535 0.7546
(10.86) (10.90)
Peer_roe 0.1456 0.0241
(0.52) (0.16)
Peer_roePri 0.7969 0.2255
(1.97) (1.02)
Pri 0.0217 0.0217 0.0189 0.0389
(0.60) (0.60) (0.50) (1.09)
Age 0.0050 0.0050 0.0068 0.0067
(1.05) (1.05) (1.46) (1.43)
Lev 0.4445 0.4433 0.2507 0.2493
(5.12) (5.10) (2.88) (2.86)
Size 0.3435 0.3439 0.3137 0.3148
(20.03) (20.03) (18.64) (18.42)
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Table 8
Full sample tests of strong-form RPE.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Unsys_ret 0.0349 0.0318
(2.57) (2.36)
Sys_ret 0.0161 0.0371
(0.35) (1.15)
Unsys_roe 0.7516 0.7525
(10.94) (10.96)
Sys_roe 0.8094 0.6811
(1.98) (1.98)
Age 0.0055 0.0056 0.0074 0.0074
(1.16) (1.17) (1.59) (1.59)
Lev 0.4441 0.4426 0.2487 0.2486
(5.11) (5.09) (2.85) (2.85)
Size 0.3458 0.3461 0.3167 0.3173
(20.42) (20.41) (19.09) (18.92)
Growth 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
(2.53) (2.58) (1.17) (1.17)
Sh 0.5046 0.5043 0.5359 0.5359
(4.82) (4.82) (5.25) (5.24)
Mshare 1.6868 1.6795 1.4946 1.4963
(5.30) (5.27) (4.86) (4.87)
Rinde 0.4605 0.4602 0.4316 0.4317
(2.93) (2.93) (2.83) (2.83)
Dual 0.0741 0.0740 0.0721 0.0722
(1.69) (1.68) (1.68) (1.68)
Constant 6.4760 6.4432 6.9399 6.9327
(17.77) (17.61) (19.64) (19.47)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9590 9590 9590 9590
R-squared 0.4697 0.4696 0.4853 0.4853
F 134.0 134.1 136.9 136.8
Table 7 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Growth 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
(2.55) (2.57) (1.19) (1.28)
Sh 0.5201 0.5206 0.5562 0.5588
(5.01) (5.02) (5.49) (5.51)
Mshare 1.7773 1.7700 1.5836 1.5804
(5.43) (5.41) (5.09) (5.05)
Rinde 0.4708 0.4710 0.4468 0.4487
(3.00) (3.00) (2.93) (2.94)
Dual 0.0753 0.0754 0.0754 0.0747
(1.71) (1.72) (1.76) (1.74)
Constant 6.5395 6.5108 7.0449 7.0214
(17.47) (17.31) (19.32) (18.97)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9590 9590 9590 9590
R-squared 0.4702 0.4702 0.4860 0.4858
F 129.4 129.4 132.0 131.9
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Table 9
Ownership and strong-form RPE tests.
SOEs NonSOEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
Panel A: Subsample tests
Unsys_ret 0.0377 0.0363 0.0258 0.0253
(2.31) (2.26) (1.02) (0.98)
Sys_ret 0.0641 0.0773 0.0931 0.0128
(1.30) (1.98) (1.19) (0.23)
Unsys_roe 0.9057 0.9030 0.4622 0.4586
(10.43) (10.40) (4.80) (4.75)
Sys_roe 0.5064 0.8684 0.1772 1.6021
(1.31) (2.57) (0.14) (1.28)
Age 0.0101 0.0101 0.0124 0.0123 0.0013 0.0012 0.0009 0.0012
(1.78) (1.78) (2.25) (2.24) (0.16) (0.15) (0.11) (0.15)
Lev 0.4761 0.4755 0.2508 0.2504 0.3332 0.3330 0.1974 0.1979
(4.82) (4.81) (2.52) (2.52) (2.15) (2.15) (1.27) (1.27)
Size 0.3247 0.3251 0.2910 0.2914 0.4005 0.4010 0.3789 0.3870
(16.88) (16.86) (15.55) (15.39) (12.87) (12.89) (12.04) (12.10)
Growth 0.0029 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002
(0.60) (0.60) (0.00) (0.01) (2.66) (2.76) (2.03) (2.02)
Sh 0.4906 0.4908 0.5264 0.5260 0.4269 0.4276 0.4751 0.4759
(4.21) (4.22) (4.66) (4.65) (2.27) (2.27) (2.55) (2.56)
Mshare 7.4135 7.3924 7.1416 7.1564 1.2406 1.2348 1.1195 1.1237
(4.64) (4.62) (4.41) (4.41) (3.40) (3.38) (3.13) (3.15)
Rinde 0.5832 0.5830 0.5373 0.5372 0.3472 0.3483 0.3503 0.3511
(3.13) (3.13) (3.01) (3.01) (1.25) (1.25) (1.27) (1.27)
Dual 0.0183 0.0185 0.0262 0.0262 0.1810 0.1814 0.1727 0.1732
(0.34) (0.34) (0.49) (0.49) (2.53) (2.54) (2.47) (2.49)
Constant 6.9695 6.9557 7.5712 7.5464 5.1907 5.1292 5.5355 5.4235
(16.66) (16.51) (18.73) (18.46) (7.53) (7.45) (7.98) (7.86)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7157 7157 7157 7157 2433 2433 2433 2433
R-squared 0.5054 0.5054 0.5238 0.5237 0.3717 0.3715 0.3816 0.3824
F 119.9 119.8 122.6 122.4 26.90 26.87 27.31 27.41
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Panel B: Full sample tests using interaction terms
Unsys_ret 0.0356 0.0332
(2.63) (2.47)
Sys_ret 0.0218 0.0651
(0.48) (2.00)
Sys_ret  Pri 0.0466 0.0504
(2.72) (2.81)
Unsys_roe 0.7535 0.7546
(10.86) (10.90)
Sys_roe 0.9727 0.8102
(2.32) (2.28)
Sys_roe  Pri 2.7343 1.5829
(2.13) (1.22)
Pri 0.0214 0.0210 0.0551 0.0127
(0.59) (0.58) (0.93) (0.21)
Age 0.0050 0.0050 0.0068 0.0067
(1.05) (1.05) (1.46) (1.43)
Lev 0.4445 0.4433 0.2507 0.2493
(5.12) (5.10) (2.88) (2.86)
Size 0.3435 0.3439 0.3137 0.3148
(20.03) (20.03) (18.64) (18.42)
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Table 9 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Growth 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
(2.55) (2.57) (1.19) (1.28)
Sh 0.5201 0.5206 0.5562 0.5588
(5.01) (5.02) (5.49) (5.51)
Mshare 1.7773 1.7700 1.5836 1.5804
(5.43) (5.41) (5.09) (5.05)
Rinde 0.4708 0.4710 0.4468 0.4487
(3.00) (3.00) (2.93) (2.94)
Dual 0.0753 0.0754 0.0754 0.0747
(1.71) (1.72) (1.76) (1.74)
Constant 6.5395 6.5105 7.0419 7.0201
(17.47) (17.31) (19.30) (19.03)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9590 9590 9590 9590
R-squared 0.4702 0.4702 0.4860 0.4858
F 129.4 129.4 132.0 131.9
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residuals of model (4) are Unsys_perf, and Sys_perf is the diﬀerence between Perf and Unsys_perf. Perfor-
mance measured as stock returns refers to Sys_ret and Unsys_ret respectively. Performance measured as
accounting performance refers to Sys_roe and Unsys_roe respectively. We use model (5) to test whether the
full sample uses strong-form RPE. If strong-form RPE exists, then the coeﬃcient, a2, will be insigniﬁcant.Lncp ¼ a0 þ a1Unsys perf þ a2Sys perf þ a3Ageþ a4Levþ a5Sizeþ a6Growthþ a7Shþ a8Mshare
þ a9Rindeþ a10Dualþ RYear þ RIndustry þ e ð5ÞTable 8 shows the regression results for model (5). We ﬁnd that Unsys_ret and Unsys_roe are signiﬁcantly
positive. Sys_ret is not signiﬁcant, whereas Sys_roe is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This indicates
that accounting performance does not support strong-form RPE.
Next, we consider the type of ownership. Table 9 Panel A presents the regression results for the subsamples
by type of ownership. Table 9 Panel A shows that Sys_perf for non-SOEs is insigniﬁcant, whereas Sys_perf for
SOEs is positive and signiﬁcant at the 5% level in columns (2) and (4). This indicates that the SOE subsample
does not support strong-form RPE. Systematic performance will increase executive pay. The results of model
(6), shown in Panel B of Table 9, further reveal the diﬀerence between SOEs and non-SOEs, and we ﬁnd that
the interactions are negative and signiﬁcant.Lncp ¼ a0 þ a1Unsys perf þ a2Sys perf þ a3Sys perf  Priþ a4Priþ a5Ageþ a6Levþ a7Size
þ a8Growthþ a9Shþ a10Mshareþ a11Rindeþ a12Dualþ RYear þ RIndustry þ e ð6ÞThe results in Tables 8 and 9 suggest that strong-form RPE is more widely applied in non-SOEs than in
SOEs.4.4. Robustness tests
We conduct the following several robustness tests: (1) we use the change in executive compensation – the
diﬀerence between the natural logarithm of the top three executives’ total cash compensation and the value for
the previous year – as the explanatory variable; (2) we use the total cash compensation for the entire manage-
ment (directors, supervisors and managers) as the explanatory variable; and (3) we construct peer groups using
operating income as a proxy for size. Due to space limitations, we only present the results for model (2). The
Table 10
Robustness tests.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Panel A: Change in executive compensation as the explanatory variable
Ret 0.0477 0.0510
(4.12) (4.36)
Peer_ret 0.0813 0.0202
(1.74) (0.75)
Peer_ret  Pri 0.0270 0.0301
(1.99) (2.26)
Roe 0.2558 0.2558
(7.55) (7.55)
Peer_roe 0.2231 0.1176
(1.31) (1.43)
Peer_roe  Pri 0.3606 0.2643
(1.55) (2.08)
Pri 0.0009 0.0033 0.0039 0.0003
(0.07) (0.27) (0.28) (0.02)
Age 0.0030 0.0030 0.0036 0.0034
(2.67) (2.68) (3.22) (3.10)
Lev 0.0507 0.0523 0.0171 0.0162
(1.94) (1.99) (0.64) (0.61)
Size 0.0096 0.0094 0.0016 0.0026
(2.30) (2.27) (0.36) (0.55)
Growth 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(8.47) (8.43) (9.29) (9.15)
Sh 0.0340 0.0347 0.0243 0.0222
(1.34) (1.38) (0.98) (0.90)
Mshare 0.4015 0.4078 0.3239 0.3215
(3.37) (3.43) (2.81) (2.79)
Rinde 0.0459 0.0455 0.0382 0.0385
(0.61) (0.60) (0.52) (0.52)
Dual 0.0023 0.0022 0.0029 0.0028
(0.15) (0.14) (0.20) (0.19)
Constant 0.2013 0.1708 0.0352 0.0641
(2.26) (1.99) (0.40) (0.68)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8770 8770 8770 8770
R-squared 0.0337 0.0335 0.0379 0.0381
F 10.29 10.28 11.50 11.69
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Panel B: Total cash compensation for entire management as the explanatory variable
Ret 0.0259 0.0232
(1.91) (1.72)
Peer_ret 0.0533 0.0076
(1.18) (0.23)
Peer_ret  Pri 0.0294 0.0344
(1.76) (2.07)
Roe 0.6826 0.6831
(10.22) (10.26)
Peer_roe 0.4019 0.1929
(1.56) (1.28)
Peer_roe  Pri 1.0828 0.3854
(2.59) (1.73)
Pri 0.0558 0.0552 0.0372 0.0633
(1.55) (1.53) (0.97) (1.78)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Age 0.0071 0.0071 0.0055 0.0057
(1.53) (1.52) (1.21) (1.25)
Lev 0.4172 0.4159 0.2388 0.2382
(4.84) (4.82) (2.74) (2.73)
Size 0.4099 0.4102 0.3828 0.3809
(21.73) (21.72) (20.46) (19.95)
Growth 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.24) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26)
Sh 0.6098 0.6103 0.6408 0.6450
(5.93) (5.93) (6.36) (6.39)
Mshare 1.8208 1.8122 1.6517 1.6426
(5.11) (5.07) (4.86) (4.79)
Rinde 0.2802 0.2802 0.2563 0.2594
(1.78) (1.78) (1.67) (1.69)
Dual 0.0438 0.0438 0.0442 0.0431
(0.95) (0.95) (0.98) (0.95)
Constant 6.1808 6.1472 6.6083 6.6535
(15.00) (14.89) (16.36) (16.18)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9464 9464 9464 9464
R-squared 0.4575 0.4575 0.4718 0.4716
F 103.5 103.3 106.6 106.5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Panel C: Constructing peer groups using operating income as proxy for size
Ret 0.0339 0.0295
(2.44) (2.03)
Peer_ret 0.0216 0.0320
(0.48) (0.88)
Peer_retPri 0.0502 0.0527
(2.82) (2.89)
Roe 0.7484 0.7333
(10.77) (10.76)
Peer_roe 1.1974 1.1955
(1.62) (3.24)
Peer_roePri 0.5568 1.2413
(0.53) (1.99)
Pri 0.0247 0.0201 0.0188 0.0254
(0.68) (0.55) (0.25) (0.48)
Age 0.0049 0.0053 0.0071 0.0067
(1.01) (1.10) (1.51) (1.43)
Lev 0.4412 0.4475 0.2438 0.2418
(5.07) (5.10) (2.80) (2.75)
Size 0.3435 0.3461 0.3147 0.3029
(19.99) (20.06) (18.68) (17.58)
Growth 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002
(2.54) (2.67) (1.31) (1.36)
Sh 0.5226 0.5185 0.5690 0.5610
(5.04) (4.94) (5.63) (5.42)
Mshare 1.7214 1.7204 1.5532 1.5376
(5.36) (5.23) (4.92) (4.81)
Rinde 0.5070 0.5129 0.4425 0.4225
(3.20) (3.23) (2.88) (2.70)
Dual 0.0755 0.0926 0.0747 0.0812
(1.72) (2.08) (1.72) (1.84)
(continued on next page)
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Table 10 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables M1 M2 M1 M2
Constant 6.5079 6.4473 6.9508 7.2232
(17.36) (17.11) (18.78) (19.44)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9448 9036 9448 9036
R-squared 0.4702 0.4685 0.4862 0.4893
F 128.1 123.7 129.5 125.9
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vious analysis.
In addition, we carry out other unreported tests: (1) we measure accounting performance by Roa instead of
Roe; (2) we measure peer group performance as the median rather than the mean of performance; and (3) we
denote D as 1 if a company’s performance is below 10% or the median when testing the asymmetry of RPE.
The results are consistent with our previous ﬁndings.5. Conclusions and limitations
RPE is a long-discussed theoretical problem. Although a number of new research methods and research
ﬁndings on RPE have recently emerged, there have been relatively few studies in China and their methods
and conclusions diﬀer. This paper follows the latest research, such as Albuquerque (2009), to examine the
use of RPE in listed companies in China.
We use data on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 1999 to 2009. The results show that
overall, RPE does not exist in China’s listed companies, nor is there asymmetry in the use of RPE. In contrast
to the extant literature, we argue that the type of ownership cannot be ignored when researching RPE in
China. When we consider the type of ownership, we ﬁnd that RPE is more likely to be used in non-SOEs than
in SOEs. This result is likely due to the regulation of cash compensation, various forms of incentives and the
multiple tasks of managers in SOEs. These results are stable across a variety of relative performance measures
and robustness tests. In addition, our results show that there is little diﬀerence between the traditional method
and Albuquerque‘s (2009) method of constructing peer groups.
Of course, this paper still has some limitations. First, Faulkender and Yang (2010) ﬁnd that using peer
groups disclosed by the company is superior to constructing them using Albuquerque‘s (2009) method. This
means that our method can be improved upon. For example, maybe all companies select the same several
companies with a high reputation in the industry as their peer group. Our method may miss this result.
Second, there are various incentives in SOEs and RPE may be used in decisions on perks or promotion rather
than cash compensation. Chen et al. (2005b) and Zhou et al. (2005) ﬁnd evidence to suggest that RPE is
used in the promotion of local government oﬃcials. Third, the multiple tasks in SOEs make it diﬃcult to
evaluate the true eﬀort of managers. Excluding these factors may make our results more precise. These points
not only represent the limitations of this study, but also future research directions.Acknowledgments
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